The personalities of central bankers moved center stage during the recent financial crisis. Some central bankers even gained "superstar" status. In this paper, we evaluate the pivotal role of superstar central bankers by assessing the difference an outstanding governor makes to economic performance. We employ school grades given to central bankers by the financial press. A superstar central banker is one receiving the top grade. In a probit estimation we first relate the grades to measures of economic performance, institutional features, and personal characteristics. We then employ a nearest neighbor matching approach to identify the central bankers which are closest to those receiving the top grade and compare the economic performance across both groups. The results suggest that a superstar governor indeed matters: a topgraded central banker faces a significantly more favorable output-inflation trade-off than his peers. This effect is driven by outstanding central bankers in emerging markets.
"You've heard of an international market for superstar soccer players.
We need an international market for superstar central bankers."
Matthew O'Brien, April 19, 2012 . Some central bankers, such as Mark Carney, even gained "superstar" (Financial Times, 2013) status. This attribute is also shared by Raghuram Rajan, the new governor of the Reserve Bank of India, whose nomination raised the highest expectations. Another example is Mario Draghi, president of the European Central Bank, whom the public dubbed "Super Mario." A decade ago, a "cult of personality" (Blinder and Reis, 2005) emerged around Alan "The Maestro" Greenspan, who was probably the role model of a superstar central banker.
Attached to these characterizations is the hope that an exceptionally charismatic and highly competent governor could steer the economy through an expedited recovery from the recession and a more favorable output-inflation trade-off in general. As central banks these days rely more on unconventional measures of monetary policy such as forward-guidance and less on conventional interest rate policy the success of these policies became even more dependent on how policy is perceived by the public. In this paper, we evaluate the pivotal role of the superstar central bankers empirically. We assess the difference a governor makes to the course of the business cycle and whether the superstar status some central bankers enjoy is justified based on economic performance. Given the complexity of the central bankers' tasks and the multiplicity of shocks and factors driving economic performance, this is a complicated task.
An empirical analysis of superstar central bank governors faces two major challenges.
The first is how to quantify the superstar status and the changes thereof. The second is to isolate the effect of the governor's personality on the economy while acknowledging that the superstar status is of course highly endogenous and reflects good economic performance. A low and stable rate of inflation and a sustainable path of economic growth, for example, are likely to qualify a central banker for a superstar status. Given the persistence of macroeconomic developments and the prevalence of good monetary policy, however, such an economy will continue to exhibit a favorable path in the future, independent of whether the central banker enjoys a superstar status or not. Hence, netting out the effect of status alone is not straightforward. Of course, the impact is also highly dependent on the institutional framework. We therefore control as much as possible for institutional factors. We follow the approach of Malmendier and Tate (2009) in their seminal analysis of CEO performance to address these challenges in the following two-step procedure.
First, we hand-collect data on school grades regularly given to central bankers by the financial press. A superstar central banker is one receiving the top grade. Hence, the status can be gained and lost during our sample period. The school grades range from A to D and are given once a year such that we have a panel structure at hand.
We construct a data set for 29 countries covering the period 2001−2012. We use a probit approach to relate the grades to standard measures of economic performance, institutional variables, and personal characteristics. This gives us probabilities for a central banker with certain characteristics to receive the top grade and, in addition, allows us assessing the reasonableness of the grading decisions.
Second, we employ a nearest neighbor matching approach to identify the central bankers which are closest to those receiving the top grade. We then compare the performance of economies under superstar central bankers to those economies which are not fortunate enough to have a superstar governor heading its central bank. By doing this we isolate the effect of the central banker's status on economic outcomes.
Detecting a markedly favorable development in the former economy would be indicative for the conducive role of a superstar governor. This would also indicate that the personality of the central banker matters beyond and above the central bank as an institution.
A priori, the effect of superstar status on economic performance is ambiguous. An outstanding central banker could lead to anchored inflation expectations and, hence, raise the central bank's credibility such that the sacrifice ratio falls. In an ailing economy, a superstar central banker could also be a boost to private sector confidence and, therefore, being supportive to consumption and investment. A prominent central banker could raise the public's trust in the central bank's strategy, in particular, if unconventional policies lead the central bank into uncharted territories. Furthermore, such a central banker might be seen as an insurance for avoiding particularly severe recessions or financial crises. These channels would explain why the economies of superstar central bankers are outperforming others.
However, there could also be detrimental effects. If a highly respected central banker devotes too much attention to, for instance, international fora or academic conferences the quality of policy could suffer. Moreover, his peers with a less favorable reception by the financial press or, more important, the public in general might feel the pressure to improve their performance which would eventually narrow the gap between the performance of superstar-led economies and the rest.
Our results suggest that superstar central bankers indeed matter. Under a topgraded central banker, the growth rate of real GDP at the end of the award year is about 0.74 percentage points (pp) higher compared to an economy under a central banker as close as possible to the superstar. In addition, the expected growth rate of real GDP is 0.33 pp higher at the end of the award year and 0.56 pp in the year thereafter. In contrast, there is no significant difference in terms of inflation during the two years after the award. This suggests that the additional reputation of topgraded central bankers helps improving the output-inflation trade-off since inflation expectations remain anchored despite higher growth (expectations). Overall, our results suggest that hiring a superstar central banker pays off. We also find that the favorable role of superstars stems from the emerging market subsample. Coming back to the before mentioned cases, it seems that a superstar governor Rajan matters more than a superstar heading the Bank of England.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Section two embeds this paper into the related literature and highlights our contribution. Section three introduces the data set and the econometric methodology. Section four explains the central bankers' status with institutional variables, person-specific variables, and macroeconomic outcomes. Section five sheds some light on the actual worth of a superstar central banker in terms of subsequent macroeconomic performance compared to his peers. A robustness test is documented in section six. Section seven concludes.
Related literature and our contribution
It is widely acknowledged that the institutional design of a central bank matters for the short-to medium-run economic performance of a country. Issues such as independence and accountability of monetary policy, a clear mandate on price stability, and a fair degree of transparency contribute to efficient macroeconomic stabilization.
We do not know, however, whether the personalities of individual central bankers matter above and beyond what is already represented by the institutions they are heading. While the fact that monetary policy decisions are often taken by committees is frequently interpreted as a means to move policy away from individuals to collectives, we recently see the (re-)appearance of strong and popular central bank leaders.
A small literature deals with the impact of central banker personalities, as opposed to central bank characteristics, on economic outcomes.
2 Siklos (2002) offers an early attempt to link central bank personalities to policy outcomes. Some anecdotal remarks are discussed in Mehrling et al (2007) . One strand of the literature looks at the determinants and the effects of a replacement of the central bank governor. Dreher et al (2008) show that the probability of replacement increases with years in office, the degree of political instability, and the level of inflation. Furthermore, Dreher et al (2010) estimate the probability for a replacement of the governor before the end of his term in office. Again, mainly political variables drive the probability of replacement. The replacement of a central bank governor also reveals information about the likely course of future policy which is reflected in financial market responses. Kuttner and Posen (2010) show that exchange rates respond significantly to the announcement of a replacement at the top of the central bank. These announcement effects are stronger if the central bank has no credible nominal anchor or if central bank independence is underdeveloped.
Another strand of research assesses the impact of policymakers' education and career background on policy outcomes. Göhlmann and Vaubel (2007) study the members of monetary policy committees of European economies before the euro inception.
They find that former central bank staff members who have been promoted to sit on the policy committee prefer lower inflation than other members. Likewise, Havrilesky and Schweitzer (1990) , Havrilesky and Gildea (1991a) , Havrilesky and Gildea (1991b) , and Harris et al (2011) find that experience in government, in the central bank, in the industry sector, and in academia are sources of variation in policy preferences. Farvaque et al (2011) use data from OECD countries and show that policymakers' background influences inflation and the effect of policymakers' experience is stronger in countries adopting inflation targeting. The role of insiders versus outsiders on monetary policy committees is studied by Besley et al (2008) .
Interestingly, they do not find differences across members' affiliations with respect to inflation and output responses. Neuenkirch and Neumeier (2013) 
The World's Top Central Bankers
We start by collecting data on central banker grades given by the financial press. These grades serve as a proxy for the superstar status of some central bankers in our investigation. The top grade is used to identify the superstar central bankers in our investigation. Consequently, we do not believe that receiving a top grade necessarily changes a central banker's behavior.
We use the "Central Banker Report Card" feature, published annually by Global
Finance magazine, typically in July or August. 4 The magazine grades central bank governors on an "A" to "D" scale for success in areas such as inflation control, economic growth goals, currency stability, and interest rate management. The magazine acknowledges that "subjective criteria also apply." Mark Carney, for example, was graded A in 2012 when he was governor of the Bank of Canada. It is important to note that these grades are given to central bank governors personally and neither for the policy of the central bank nor for the performance of the monetary policy committee.
One obvious doubt when it comes to (at least partly) subjective grading is that rankings of central bankers reflect the preferences of those constructing the rankings.
Since these preferences or the journalists' knowledge of the functioning of monetary policy are unobservable to us we cannot a priori rule out such a problem. However, before we calculate the "actual worth" of a superstar central banker in terms of subsequent performance (Section 5) we explain the grading decisions by the Global Finance magazine using a large set of explanatory variables (Section 4) thereby also testing if, for example, financial journalists prefer governors well-known for dovish monetary policy. 4 See http://www.gfmag.com/. To the best of our knowledge, these central banker grades have not been used for a serious empirical investigation before. Of course, there are other awards like, for instance, the "Central Bankers of the Year Award" handed out annually since 2004 by the The Banker (http://www.thebanker.com/Awards/Central-Bank-Governor-of-the-Year). However, there are at least two major advantages of the "Central Banker Report Card." First, it is available online since the year 2001 rather than 2004 which results in three additional years of data. Second, there is a panel for 29 continuously graded central banks which allows us to contrast and comfortably match the award winners with their peers rather than artificially creating a control group out of all central banks worldwide. 5 Table A1 in the Appendix displays the central bankers which are part of the annual grading and Table A2 implies that the control group is four times larger than the treatment group which allows us to obtain an appropriate match for the superstar central bankers in a comfortable way. Finally, the magazine does not privilege central banks in the ten 5 We focus on these 29 central banks since either the grading of other central banks started after 2001 or some of the variables used to explain the grading are not available for the complete sample period. The grades in 2012 are only used to evaluate the subsequent grading of superstar central bankers. 6 As the sample ends in 2012, it does not include the recent appointments of Raghuram Rajan at the Reserve Bank of India and Mark Carney at the Bank of England which were mentioned in the introduction. 
Explanatory variables
Since the criteria mentioned by the Global Finance magazine are far from being exhaustive we consider a long list of potential determinants of the central bankers'
grades in the subsequent analysis. Table A3 in the Appendix summarizes these variables and the respective sources. 7 Australia, Canada, Euro Area, Japan, Norway, New Zealand, Switzerland, Sweden, the United Kingdom, and the United States.
8 Argentina, Brazil, Chile, China, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Indonesia, India, Israel, Korea, Mexico, Malaysia, Philippines, Poland, the Russian Federation, Singapore, Thailand, Turkey, and South Africa. 9 We also considered using an additional variable measuring central bank independence in the regression analysis. However, the commonly used indicators by Klomp and de Haan (2009) and Dincer and Eichengreen (2013) are not available for all years in sample and all countries in the sample, respectively. 
Probit estimations
As mentioned before, we proceed in a two-step approach. First, we estimate a probit model to identify observable institutional and person-specific characteristics as well as macroeconomic outcomes that predict the grade A at the annual "Central Banker Report Card." The specification is as follows:
10 The choice in favor of (expected) real GDP growth is motivated by the fact that most central banks focus on this variable rather than on GDP gap measures in their communications (Gerlach, 2007) , probably due to the difficulty of measuring the latter in real time. Accordingly, we follow the recent Taylor rule literature (see, for example, Gorter et al, 2008; Sturm and de Haan, 2011; Neuenkirch and Tillmann, 2014) and use GDP growth measures rather than GDP gap measures.
11 The choice of the target value is straightforward in the IT economies. In case of the advanced economies without an official IT (ECB, JAP, SUI, US) and "low-inflation" emerging economies (CHN, MYS, SIN), we use 2% as proxy of an inflation target, whereas in case of "high-inflation" emerging economies (ARG, IND, RUS) we calculate deviations from a hypothetical 5% target. Finally, some of the IT economies adopted this regime for the first time during the sample period (HUN, IDN, KOR, MEX, NOR, PHI, TUR). In these cases, we employ the first officially announced IT value as proxy for a hypothetical IT before the actual start. grade * i,t is the latent continuous variable representing the grading decision. We use a binary variable (1 represents the grade A and 0 the grades B−D) to describe the decision by the Global Finance magazine. The vector X contains institutional and person-specific characteristics as well as macroeconomic variables as described before. Year-fixed effects 12 are captured by η t and the residuals i,t are assumed to follow a standard normal distribution, which implies that the probabilities of the different outcomes can be written as:
Φ denotes the cumulative standard normal distribution, Z t is the vector of explanatory variables and year-fixed effects, and δ the vector of coefficients. Figure 2 provides an illustration on the timing of the grading and the assumptions on the information sets used for the probit estimations and the calculation of the treatment effects. We use end of previous year data for the probit estimation for three reasons. First, this ensures comparability across variables since some of these variables are available at a high frequency (for instance, stock returns) while others (for instance, the transparency index or the de facto measure of the exchange rate regime) are available at annual frequency only. Second, we reduce potential endogeneity problems which might arise due to reputational effects when we use data from the year in which a central banker is considered a superstar. Finally, we can be sure that all of the variables are actually observable to the Global Finance magazine journalists at the time of their grading decision.
Since we can explicitly distinguish between the non-superstar grades B, C, and D another obvious specification is to estimate Equation (1) using an ordered probit model. For this purpose, we create a discrete variable for the grades where the top grade A has the highest value. However, since the nearest neighbor matching algorithm, which we use to identify differences in the subsequent performance of central bankers, relies on a binary distinction between top-graded central bankers and those who get the grades B, C, and D we show ordered probit estimates only as a robustness test in Section 4.
Calculation of treatment effects
Second, we use a nearest neighbor matching approach to identify the central bankers which are closest to those receiving the top grade. Obviously, the grading decision is not independent of the macroeconomic and institutional environment of a central banker. A favorable environment might explain why a central banker has received the top grade and, given the persistence of macroeconomic variables, be an indicator of high growth rates and subdued inflationary pressures in the future. To overcome this simultaneity problem, we create a control group which is, compared to the superstars, as identical as possible in terms of observable characteristics. Finally, we contrast the subsequent performance in terms of macroeconomic outcomes across both groups. The resulting Abadie-Imbens (2006 average treatment effect on the treated provides us an estimate of the influence of superstar central bankers compared to those individuals that are most similar but do not get the top grade:
The counterfactual mean for those being treated, E[y 0 |τ = 1], is not observed.
Therefore, we have to choose a proper substitute for it in order to estimate the average treatment effect on the treated. Using the mean outcome of untreated individuals, E[y 0 |τ = 0], in our non-experimental setup is not suitable because, as mentioned before, it is most likely that components which determine the treatment decision also determine the outcome variable of interest. The nearest neighbor matching approach attempts to mimic randomization by finding the most similar individual that did not receive the treatment. For that purpose, we rely on the same covariates as used in the probit estimations. Formally, the distance between two observations x i and x j is parameterized by:
S is a symmetric, positive-definite matrix with 1 n being an n × 1 vector of ones, I p being the identity matrix of order p,x = ( w i x i )/( w i ), and W being an n × n diagonal matrix containing frequency weights w i :
To obtain the nearest neighbor, we minimize the distance between each superstar and all non-superstar observations. 13 The mean of this artificially created control group of nearest neighbors is then employed as a substitute for E[y 0 |τ = 1] in (3).
A concern is that the remaining heterogeneity, which is not correlated with the explanatory variables, across superstar central bankers and their matches biases our estimation. To minimize this concern, we include a large number of explanatory variables to ensure that award winners and those in the control sample are indistinguishable along most observable dimensions. Therefore, the differences in terms of subsequent macroeconomic performance between the top-graded central bankers and their nearest neighbors should be due to unobservable characteristics or, put differently, the superstar status.
Another problem associated with our procedure is that some of the top-rated central bankers and some of the nearest neighbors retire during the year after the award was handed out. Since this paper is interested in the impact a superstar central banker has compared to her/his peers we drop these observations for the calculation of treatment effects for the year t + 1. On the other hand, monetary policy is typically associated with a considerable outside lag. To account for this phenomenon,
we conduct a robustness test where we compare the influence of superstar central bankers during the year t + 1 even if they have left office before. Table 1 shows the results of the probit estimation (left panel) and the ordered probit estimation (right panel) of Equation (1). To conserve space, we concentrate on the probit estimations in the following interpretation.
Explaining central bankers' status
First, more experience in office increases the probability of becoming a superstar central banker. The maximum positive effect is found after 8.9 years when the conditional likelihood of being awarded with an A is 32.4 pp higher than for a governor without any experience in office. 14 Staying in office for too long, however, reduces the probability of getting an A. In addition, the conditional probability of being a superstar central banker is 28.5 pp higher for the four female governors in our sample (Mercedes Marco del Pont, Zeti Akhtar Aziz, Tarisa Watanagase, and Gill 13 We do not a priori restrict the group of non-superstars to, for instance, the second-best grade B since 39.6 percent of the superstar central bankers are matched with a C or D counterpart.
14 Examples for top-graded governors with a lot of experience in office are Zeti Akhtar Aziz (2009, 9 years; 2010, 10 years; 2011, 11 years) and Tito Mboweni (2008, 9 years).
Marcus) than for their male counterparts. One possible explanation is that female governors are more charismatic or more talented than their male counterparts as raising the ranks of the male-dominated central bank is harder for them.
Second, only one of the institutional variables significantly explains the grading.
Central bankers who work under a freely floating exchange rate regime are 19.3 pp more likely to being awarded the top grade. Maintaining a floating exchange rate might be seen as a good insurance against a painful currency crisis and, hence, rewarded by a good grade. Since all other institutional factors considered in the probit estimation do not significantly explain the grading we can conclude that the press abstracts mostly from the institutional framework when awarding their grades. Instead, it seems that is indeed the individual governor that is subject to the evaluation.
Finally, credit expansion is appreciated by the press but only up to a degree which they consider as not too excessive. Up to a ratio of domestic credit to the private sector over GDP of 67.4 percent the likelihood a becoming a superstar central banker increases with a maximum change of 17.3 pp. For higher ratios, the effect is decreasing. In addition, higher real GDP growth rates also contribute to a higher Turning to the ordered probit results, the findings of the probit estimation are confirmed with the estimates for too dovish and too hawkish monetary policy being the only exceptions. Note that, however, the significances and the model's fit are weaker in the right panel of Table 1 .
5 How much is a superstar central banker worth?
Baseline results
First, we illustrate the macroeconomic performance of superstar central bankers, their nearest neighbors ("predicted winners"), and all non-superstar central bankers in Figure 3 .
In case of the (expected) inflation gap, actual winners perform better than predicted winners at the end of the pre-award year and the end of the award year. At the end of the post-award year, this picture changes as the predicted winners perform better. Since the expected inflation gap is, on average, never larger than 23 bps both groups are able to anchor inflation expectations well. A similar picture emerges when looking at the difference between these two groups in case of the central bank's target interest rate. Superstar central bankers have an, on average, a lower interest rate over the first two years, whereas in the third year their target rate is slightly higher compared to the predicted winners. Most strikingly are the differences in case of (expected) real GDP growth. The difference between the superstars and the nearest neighbors is positive all the time and it widens considerably at the end of the post-award year.
These figures illustrate why it is important to create an appropriate control group before calculating treatment effects since all non-winners perform considerably different than the predicted winners. In addition, the matching procedure generated a really competitive control group as the predicted winners perform even better in case of some years and variables than the top-graded central bankers.
Next, to get a more formalized picture of the differences between superstar central bankers and their matches, we estimate the average treatment effects on the treated. Table 2 shows the results for the end of the award year and the end of the subsequent year.
The estimates for the overall sample confirm the visual impression that there is no significant difference in case of inflation (expectations) and the central bank rate for top-graded central bankers compared to their nearest neighbors. 15 In case of (expected) real GDP growth, however, there are significant differences. In a superstar-led economy, real GDP growth is 0.74 pp larger than in an economy led by a nearest neighbor at the end of the post-award year. In addition, superstars boost growth expectations before the actual increase in growth as we notice a difference of 0.33 pp at the end of the award year. This positive effect carries over to the end of the next year where we observe a "superstar effect" of 0.56 pp.
Thus, superstar central bankers do indeed perform better than their matches as they boost the economy in terms of higher (expected) real GDP growth without generating significantly higher inflation (expectations). The emerging picture is consistent with a more favorable output-inflation trade-off for superstar central bankers. Finally, we look a bit closer at the grading of top-graded central bankers and their nearest neighbor in the subsequent year. The average grade of superstar central bankers remains about 0.98 notches better which implies that there is some persistence in the grading. Table 2 also shows the results for several subsamples. First, we slice our sample into advanced and emerging countries, respectively. We re-do the analysis separately on each subsample when assigning the nearest neighbor to the 18 top-graded central bankers in the advanced economies and the 35 superstars in the emerging economies.
Subsample analysis and further results
The estimates indicate that the latter drive our main findings as a superstar central banker in emerging economies realizes higher GDP growth, both current and expected, and even a lower expected inflation gap. For mature economies, we observe a similar pattern, which is, however, not significant at the 10% level. One interpretation of these findings is that top-graded central bankers can compensate for "weak" institutions. They have more discretion at hand and, thus, more room to shine at the top of the central bank. at the end of the award year. Thus, this finding is even stronger compared to the overall sample where the difference was "close" to being significant. Similarly to the top of Table 2 , we also find a positive and significant effect on (expected) real GDP growth. During the crisis period, however, we observe an even stronger influence of superstars on output as the treatment effect is three times higher at the end of the next year in case of actual real GDP growth and at the of the award year in case of expected real GDP growth. These results suggest that economies led by a superstar central banker experience a boost in confidence. During the turbulent economic and financial crisis, a superstar central banker helps restoring confidence in the economy and leads to a massive increase in (expected) growth. However, one negative consequence during the crisis period is that boosting the economy has a negative side-effect in terms of a significantly higher expected inflation gap.
Finally, as mentioned in Section 3.4, one problem associated with our procedure is that some of the top-rated central bankers and some of the nearest neighbors retire during the year after the award was handed out. So far, we dropped these observations for the calculation of treatment effects for the year t + 1. However, it can be argued that due to the considerable outside lag of monetary policy central bankers might have an impact on the economy even after they have left office. Thus,
we also compare the influence of superstar central bankers with their peers during the year t + 1 even if they have left office before (bottom of Table 2 ). The results are a bit weaker than in the top of Table 2 as only the coefficient for expected real GDP growth is significant. This indicates that the more favorable output-inflation trade-off is directly linked to the personality of the superstar central bankers and less so to the economy in which the superstar central banker works.
6 Robustness test using a non-matching approach
In this section, we explore the robustness of our findings using a different approach.
Thus far, we have relied on a nearest neighbor matching approach and a timevarying definition of the superstar status via the grades of Global Finance. It might be argued, however, that these grades are a combination of time-varying institutional and macroeconomic conditions and the time-invariant ability (see also Hansen et al, 2014 ) of a central banker.
To obtain a proxy of the central bankers' ability, we regress the grades on the same set of explanatory variables as used in Sections 4 and 5 and central banker-fixed effects in a linear probability model:
The central banker-fixed effects θ CB i are then extracted from Equation (6) and represent the time-invariant part of the grading decision which is not explained by the vector of explanatory variables. Thus, these fixed effects proxy the relative ability of central bankers beyond the macroeconomic and institutional environment.
In a final step, we regress the outcome variables on a constant term and this newly created ability variable:
A significant coefficient for β implies that the central bankers' ability has an impact on the policy variable of interest. To give the constant term α a natural interpretation, we de-mean the central banker-fixed effects. That is, a positive fixed effect implies a central banker with an above average ability and vice versa. Table 3 sets out the results. Whereas we do not find significant coefficients in case of the (expected) inflation gap and the central bank rate, the central bankers' ability matters for both, the actual real GDP growth rate and the expected real GDP growth rate. A central banker with an ability that is, on average, one notch better than predicted by the macroeconomic and institutional environment, yields a 0.88 pp higher real GDP growth rate than a central banker whose average grade is in line with the average environment he or she works in. The corresponding coefficient for expected real GDP growth is a bit smaller with 56.5 bps for a one-unit change in the ability variable.
To summarize, the nearest neighbor matching results using a time-varying definition of the superstar status are confirmed using a non-matching approach and a time-invariant central banker ability variable. Superstar central bankers can boost (expected) output growth with no adverse consequences for (expected) inflation.
Finally, it is worth mentioning that the ability variables can explain 4.2% and 7.2% of the fluctuations in actual and expected real GDP growth, respectively.
Concluding remarks
Recently, ECB president Mario Draghi (2013) This paper showed that the hopes the press and the public attach to top central bankers are, at least partly, justified. Central bankers receiving the top grade by the financial press, our empirical proxy for a superstar status, deliver significantly higher rates of (expected) real growth in the absence of higher inflation (expectations). Thus, they face a more favorable output-inflation trade-off than other central bankers. The nearest neighbor matching approach isolates the effect of the superstar status by appropriately controlling for the endogenous nature of the school grade.
We also show that the more favorable output-inflation trade-off is directly linked to the personality of the superstar central bankers and less so to the economy in which the superstar central banker works. In particular, exceptional central bankers in emerging markets make a difference and appear to drive our main findings. Thus, outstanding central bankers are able to compensate for "weak" institutions. Overall, a "boost in confidence" is one of the most plausible reasons why a superstar has a influence on (expected) real GDP growth.
If one is willing to interpret becoming a superstar central banker as building a reputation the results presented in this paper could also be seen through the lens of the signaling or reputation-building literature. 17 Although signaling in the theoretical literature is narrowly defined as being tough on inflation in order to transmit information to the public receiving a top grade also reveals information that helps improving the output-inflation trade-off. 18 We would be happy to include such a measure into this paper. However, the number of central banks publishing voting records is not sufficiently large enough to conduct such an analysis. (1). Model includes year-fixed effects (not shown). A significance level of 1%, 5%, and 10% is indicated by ***, **, and *, respectively. Standard errors are clustered at the central banker's level (Rogers, 1993) . Notes: Results of Abadie-Imbens (2006 estimation of average treatment effects on the treated (Equation (3)). A significance level of 1%, 5%, and 10% is indicated by ***, **, and *, respectively. Abadie-Imbens (2012) robust standard errors are used.π: inflation gap;π E : expected inflation gap; i T : central bank rate; gY : real GDP growth rate; gY E : expected real GDP growth rate; N : number of observations. Results of least squares estimation of Equation (7). A significance level of 1%, 5%, and 10% is indicated by ***, **, and *, respectively. Standard errors are clustered at the central bank's level (Rogers, 1993) .π: inflation gap;π E : expected inflation gap; i T : central bank rate; gY : real GDP growth rate; gY E : expected real GDP growth rate; N : number of observations. Notes: The missing observations correspond to those cases where a new governor has taken office and the time elapsed since inauguration is too short to reliably assess her/his performance. The Global Finance magazine acknowledges that it is "too early to say" something about the governor's performance. 
